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A 100 smart cities, a 100 utopias
Ayona Datta
University of Leeds, UK
Abstract
In my response to the commentaries on my anchor article, I have taken on board the key question of how
and why India has become the site of production of 100 proposed smart cities. I forward a notion of
‘technocratic nationalism’ to suggest that it is the young urban population in India who have largely bought
into the smart city dream. Whilst drawing encouragement from the largely positive commentaries on my
article, I then take on three main critiques of the article – first, that it has inadvertently promoted a
hegemony of ‘city-ness’ by focusing on the imagined smart city to be; second, that the smart city has strong
connections with colonial urban planning and third, whether Dholera should be considered the first smart
city at all. I suggest that the article’s city-ness and postcolonial links to India’s urban planning is both political
and heuristic, since it is the postcolonial ‘urban’ moment where India has situated its moment of modernity
globalization and economic power. I contend that the final critique is based on a misinterpretation of the use
of the word ‘first’, which was always intended to reflect a politics of innovation among cities. Finally, I suggest
that the other ‘gaps’ in my article highlighted by one of the commentators is not a gap, rather beyond the
scope and objectives of an exploratory article such as this.
Keywords
smart city, urbanization, Indian middle class, urban entrepreneurs, postcolonial urbanism
Chasing the moolah
Recently I was contacted to do some research by an
organization that works in an advisory capacity to the
Indian software industry. I proposed research that
would lead to recommendations for overcoming the
challenges facing the urban poor to become ‘smart cit-
izens’ in India. The answer from their research and
development head stated, ‘our clients are not interested
in these social projects. That is for the government to
implement. They are only interested in the moolah’.
This statement sumsupquite neatly themotivation
behind smart cities in India – the ‘moolah’.As a socio-
logical moment presented in a conversation between
an academic and a corporate entity, this cuts through
the entire rhetorical apparatus to a primal moment of
capital accumulation. It summarizes, as Sassen (2014)
would argue, the most elementary forms of extraction
by the market as a driving force for smart cities. Per-
versely it answers Marcuse’s (2009: 189) question of
‘whose right, what right and to what city’ with the
answer – ‘the right of the corporate sector to accumu-
late capital from the smart city’.
Whilst this should be no surprise to critics of neo-
liberal urbanism, the puzzle then, as Watson raises in
her commentary, is ‘who they aim to convince with
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their unlikely claims’.Greenfield furthermuses, ‘why
this particular confluence of ideas, why India, why
now?’This question directs us to find answers in a tar-
get audience that now stokes the dream of 100 smart
cities in India. I reinforce here that a forensic analysis
of the ‘rhetorics of urgency’ is immensely important
since they do much of the work in sustaining the
aspirations of a rising urban middle-class youth who,
in turn, reinforces the power of the smart city trope. In
startingmyanalysis from this imagined city then, I am
not implicitly or explicitly reinforcing an ideological
moment vested in the urban age. This ideology is
already propagated by McKinseys, KPMG, Accent-
ure, PriceWaterHouse Coopers and other global con-
sultancies with their striking graphs and pie charts
depicting India’s urbanization. I am interested in
exploring the city as a heuristic, as India’s experiment
with modernity and globalization. This does not dis-
count the challenges faced by those who must be for-
cibly brought to line up with India’s urban dreams,
often through a rule of law. The ‘urban’ has powerful
myth-making capabilities in Indian nationalistic
space andchallenging thismyth is an important objec-
tive of my work on smart cities.
The aspirations of the ‘technocratic
nationalists’
It would be misleading however to suggest that the
smart city machinery is kept well oiled only by the
neo-liberal state and its moolah-seeking business
partners. India is set to become the youngest country
globally by 2020, with 64% of its population in the
working age group (IRIS-UN, 2013). Smart cities
are part of the dreams and aspirations of ‘success’
of a young urban population who are, in the words
of Leela Fernandes (2006: 15), ‘[p]roducts and pro-
moters of globalization’. This young population
grew up in a post-liberalized India relatively pro-
tected from ‘shortages and rationing’ (Fernandes,
2006) and for whom the Muslim pogrom of 2002
in Gujarat is not a living memory. In India, this rather
young but heterogeneous group consists of software
engineers, middling entrepreneurs, management
professionals, Public Relations (PR) consultants,
advertising professionals and so on. In the recent
elections, this group rejected the earlier ruling
party, considered as elitist, ‘dynastic’ and corrupt,
for a masculinist state headed by a ‘subaltern hero’
(Roy, 2011) who believes in the power of technol-
ogy to transform social life. It is this group that has
passed globalization through a sieve of ‘Indian cul-
ture’ to produce a technocratic nationalism in
which to be patriotic is to believe in the power of
technology. Harris (2015: 25) asks in his commen-
tary, ‘How can we assume Dholera promotional
videos instil an active desire for its materialization
among the Indian young upwardly mobile urban
population’. My answer is to observe the social
media revolution in India and read the comments
under every article on smart cities to get a sense of
the flood of support that smart cities has received
from young urban Indians. It supports the point that
Greenfield makes in his commentary – ‘to be a soft-
ware engineer in this new economy is a noble thing,
for in the end what else does so much of the new
prosperity consist of but software?’ For this group,
to ask questions of social, spatial and environmental
justice associated with the smart city is to become
‘anti-developmental’ and by extension, anti-Indian
– allegedly an agent of the West.
For sure, a dogmatic faith in technology has been a
sustained feature of Indian nationalism and moder-
nity. The first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal
Nehru believed that through the technological
advances vested in new industries, roads, bridges,
dams and cities, India would achieve development
and progress after centuries of impoverishment under
colonial rule. However, it is only now that the lan-
guage ofmoolah is translated by the state and its busi-
ness partners into a make–believe modernity that is
seen to announce India’s global position as an eco-
nomic superpower. As Jazeel notes, ‘the representa-
tional work upon which urban futures depend, and
more unequivocally upon which “city-ness” depends
as an imaginative geography’ is wholly connected to
these young aspirations. And it is precisely the terrain
of rhetoric around smart cities that captures the imag-
ination of India’s urban youth.
Is Dholera the ‘first’ smart city?
My article has been accused of coming ‘close to
inadvertently reinforcing the hyperbolic and
50 Dialogues in Human Geography 5(1)
unsubstantiated rhetoric accompanying its pro-
motion’ (Harris, 2015: 25). Harris suggests that
the title of ‘first smart city’ is actually contentious
and that ‘it is likely that Dholera will have rivals as
the exemplar for Indian smart city development’.
Citing several new smart cities currently under con-
struction or consideration in India, Harris notes
that a more multisited research would have pro-
vided better insights to the making of smart cities
in India.
This is a critique which is asking the article to
achieve what it does not claim to do at any point.
Certainly a more multisited comparative urbanism
of different smart cities currently emerging in India
would be a commendable project. And certainly it
would be worthwhile to write an article on grass-
roots utopias of Jameen Adhikar Andolan Gujarat
(JAAG) and other movements to counter the smart
city. However, does this imply that examination of
the smart city trope should not be considered of aca-
demic worth? The ‘storytelling’ power of the smart
city trope is transformational of state–citizen rela-
tions and therefore has also been the subject of study
by other academics (Soderstrom et al., 2014;
Vanolo, 2014). Harris also alleges that I reinforce
the power relations using the adjective first. This
is based on his web search of first smart cities where
he comes upon several other cities claiming to be the
first smart city. I am not contesting this finding.
Indeed if Harris does another search now, he will
find that Surat also claims to be India’s first smart
city. Following closely on the heels of the
announcement by the Indian government of creating
100 smart cities, other cities that earlier marketed
themselves as eco-cities (Lavasa), new towns
(Rajarhat) or Gujarat International Finance Tech-
Cities (GIFT) have now also begun to market them-
selves as first smart cities.
My point in the article is that Dholera was one of
the first to market itself as the first smart city
(although smart city Kochi was approved before
Dholera, but work had stalled here for a few years)
and also one of the first to be recognized as such in
the Indian state of the Union Budget in 2013. It pre-
dates the Indian proposal to build 100 new smart
cities, shortly after which GIFT began to claim the
first smart city status. First has been the most vied
for adjective in urban planning of late, since it rep-
resents a particular ‘coming of age’ for regional
states that produce them. As an adjective it is sub-
jective and political, that is, not based on any rigor-
ous terms of reference rather it represents success
in a race where the finishing line is drawn to suit
those who are in the race. Being first is associated
with innovation, originality, authenticity and
inevitably capital accumulation. Being first is
important before the smart city novelty slowly
fades away for the Indian upwardly mobile youth
to reveal the elaborate ‘myth making’ that has gone
on so far. In the race for a 100 smart cities, the win-
ners will be those who occupy the terrain first and
thus attract the most capital investment. The losers
will enter the market relatively late when the cache
of smart rhetoric have dried up, when the smart
technologies begin to reveal their failures and
when the smart city becomes yet another cliche´
in the history of global urbanism. Thus in using the
terms first smart city and ‘twice the size of Mum-
bai’ in Dholera, I was at no point suggesting that
these are neutral territories rather as made clear
from the article’s subsequent discussion of speed
and slowness that these terms in themselves have
specific credence and evoke political action when
backed by the state.
Harris is also correct in saying that the smart city
model in India will include both cities built from
scratch and modernizing existing cities. But he
writes that now from the privilege of knowing about
the 100 smart cities programme, unlike when I was
writing the article in early 2014, when Dholera was
indeed presented as the first prototype in the media
and in political campaign speeches. The spatio-
temporality of smart cities is a significant issue
here – that smart city parameters change every day
in India with new cities added or taken away, new
committees and policy notes drafted and new invest-
ments made in its different sectors. Harris also
requests that the article articulates several ‘gaps’
around the role of urban administrators, discuss why
some cities miss out being smart, how urban pro-
jects come to be ‘smart’, the technologies and infra-
structures used and so on. These are all valid
questions which I can certainly answer in future arti-
cles, but again he misses the point in that they are
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questions that are beyond the scope or objectives of
this article.
Postcolonial links
A critique by Moser has been that utopian city mak-
ing projects are not just limited to the postcolonial
state; rather they have their roots in colonial prac-
tises of city making. Indeed master-planned cities
of Calcutta and Delhi were part of the colonial
practices of mapping power and sovereignty over
territories and populations. I would in fact go further
in arguing that India has a strong continuity of urban
planning from precolonial to postcolonial sovereign
power. This was seen in new cities such as Jaipur
(built by the Rajput King Sawai Jai Singh II in
1727) and Fatehpur Sikri (built by the Mughal
emperor Akbar in 1569). Indeed modern-day Delhi
can trace its history of changing sovereign power
through seven subsequent cities built along its river
Yamuna, with the colonial city designed by Edwin
Lutyens being the last one in its history.
Dholera however shows stronger connections
with postcolonial utopian urbanism than colonial
or precolonial cities. In Dholera, the connections
between elementary forms of capital accumulation,
neo-liberal urbanism and dispossession are shar-
pened in the postcolonial moment. Dholera has con-
tinuities with several periods of India’s utopian
urbanisms, but these continuities reach a pinnacle
when we consider the rising aspirations of a ‘young
independent nation’ seeking to achieve modernity
and breaking from tradition by building smart cities
in the image of Songdo, Masdar and Singapore.
Dholera is an assemblage of global smart city dis-
courses and practices, but this assemblage has only
been able to take root in India in its particular form
becauseof its strongpostcolonialmodel ofmodernity,
rationality and development, a combination of dis-
courses particularly attractive to India’s urban youth.
My focus on India’s postcolonial moment is also
an ethnomethodological strategy that makes writing
about India and its new phase of urbanization, a
political act. In recent years, a rising tide of techno-
cratic nationalism has sought to represent much of
India’s ‘underdevelopment’ as a product of colonial
rule. Similarly, Hindutva activists have sought to
label any Marxist-feminist critiques of smart cities
as ‘pseudosecular’ and ‘anti-Indian’ – the work of
‘foreign agents’ was seeking to keep India in the
mire of colonial rule. This article then begins from
a political position – by making links between smart
cities and postcolonial rather than colonial power.
This is not to suggest that colonial urban planning
was inconsequential to contemporary planning
practices in India, certainly it laid the foundation
of postcolonial planning practices. In this article,
however, I have deliberately countered the domi-
nant rhetoric of victimhood and underdevelopment
linked to colonial rule that plagues Indian public
discourse and social media currently.
Beyond the smart city
This article starts from the smart city, a place that is
imagined rather than the already existing material
space of the villages that will make way for the smart
city to come. Jazeel articulates an important critique
that city-ness reinforces a hegemonic knowledge pro-
duction by making cities as the entry point of all cri-
tiques of urbanization. This is a broader critique that
can be levelled at the discipline of urban studies
which reinforces the very primacy of the city it often
seeks to challenge. This is also an issue that I have
been acutely conscious about in my article, particu-
larly as Jazeel points out, the battlegrounds of the city
are located far from it on the rural and pastoral land-
scapes of Gujarat – places incorrectly represented as
‘terra nullis’ by smart city builders. As Watson has
identified correctly in her commentary
The inevitable result of new political interest in these
fantasy cities is that both attention and national bud-
gets will be skewed away from the urgent needs of
urban dwellers for basic sanitation, water and shelter,
and towards support for corporate demands, resulting
in an urban landscape with far higher levels of inequal-
ity and more urban dwellers living without basic urban
services.
Whilst peasants may have become the final fron-
tiers of city making (Goldman, 2011) in India, the
focus on city-ness inmyarticlewas intentional to chart
out how the grounds for capital accumulation is laid
through representation, rhetorics and storytelling
52 Dialogues in Human Geography 5(1)
around new urban utopias. This does not reduce the
importance of the very real struggles that are being
enacted by JAAG and other farmer’s movements
across India and the global south for their identities,
rights and livelihoods. Rather, the article sought to
construct a political economyof smart cities and a cul-
tural critique of its tropes to examine the ‘signs and
machines’ of raw capital accumulation,when the ‘pro-
duction of subjectivity represents the primary and per-
haps most important work of capitalism’(Lazzarato,
2014: 1). In India too ‘smart citizens’ define the new
subjects of capital consumption in the smart city.
But Greenfield asks ‘after all the farmers and
fishermen have been chased from the land, the digi-
tal infrastructure laid down, and the golf club
opened for business, what of day-to-day life in this
environment?’ The answer can be found by looking
at other examples of smart cities globally – at Singa-
pore, Songdo, Masdar and Dongtan, in whose image
Dholera and other smart cities in India are being
recast. In particular as Bunnell mentions in his com-
mentary, Dholera is a crucial reminder of the ‘intel-
ligent cities’ trope, which produced the Malaysian
Super Information Corridor. Indeed, one of the first
endeavours of the Indian Smart City Taskforce was
to visit Singapore to learn from its smart city initia-
tives. However, this learning has not included
understanding the reasons behind the effective fail-
ure of Songdo, Dongtan and Masdar to attract their
target population to provide a seamless smart urban-
ity or to become carbon neutral. Thus whilst the
Indian Prime Minister has recently visited several
countries including the United States of America
(which had earlier banned Modi from entry) and
garnered huge interest from investors to ‘help’ India
build its 100 smart cities, this has not considered
how everyday life in the smart city might hold the
potential for new forms of democratic and emanci-
patory citizenships beyond the representational
spaces of the sanitized, orderly and programmable
smart polis.
Bunnell asks ‘what technologies are being (or
could be) mobilized against those seeking to acquire
land for smart cities in India based on 100-year-old
maps’. Some of this is already shaping up with the
use of online blogs and magazines written in local
Gujarati language and by connecting with interna-
tional networks of farmers’ movements such as Via
Campesina. The JAAG campaign is grass roots and
utopian – albeit a more difficult utopia to materia-
lize because of the state’s use of ‘lawfare’ against
it. And in this context, JAAG is shaping new polit-
ical imaginings of citizenship outside of city-ness.
In answer to Bunnell’s question – ‘in what ways can
investment in smart technology-enabled futures
yield returns to more than just the corporate interests
and political elites behind the smart cities’ business
model in India?’ – This is where ethnographic and
participatory research is essential and imminent.
Watch this space.
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